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Private ownership of land has been stressed in the development literature as key
to increasing productivity in the agricultural sector. The beneficiaries of the
redistributive land reforms undertaken in many Latin American countries, how-
ever, did not receive the individual property right of the land. This paper suggests
that this type of reform was a measure intended to favor not the peasantry, but the
landed elite of those countries. It is shown that if land is the abundant factor land
rent is decreasing with the total amount of privately owned land. Thus, the landed
elite favored giving the peasants land under a restricted ownership regime. Journal
of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D23, D72, O17, Q15
1. INTRODUCTION
Redistributive land reforms have been used in many developing coun-
tries as a means of improving the living standards of the peasantry as well
as to increase productivity in the agricultural sector. Moreover, individual
ownership of the land has been stressed in the development literature as
Ž .key to achieving those two objectives see Binswanger et al., 1993, 1995 .
The beneficiaries of the land reforms in many Latin American countries,
such as Mexico, Peru, or Bolivia, however, did not receive individual
ownership of the land granted. The question addressed in this paper is why
the society in those countries chose an inefficient ownership system
instead of the efficient private ownership regime.
1 The author thanks the editor and an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions. Support
from the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Economicas and the Spanish Ministry of´
Education, DGES project PB96-0339, is gratefully acknowledged.
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The literature on land reform has stressed the link between level of
development and a more egalitarian distribution of land across the mem-
Ž .bers of society. See, for instance, Binswanger et al., 1993, 1995 , Moene
Ž . Ž . Ž .1992 , Ray and Streufert 1993 , or Besley and Burgess 1998 . A few
Ž . Ž .authors, such as Grossman 1994 and Horowitz 1993 , have analyzed why
a society decides to undergo land reform, but have abstracted from the
ownership regime under which the land is transferred to the peasants. This
is precisely the main focus of this paper.
Ž .Various authors, such as Barraclough and Collarte 1973 , De Janvry
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .1981 , Ekstein et al. 1978 , Heath et al. 1969 , and Kay 1982 , have
studied the agrarian structure and the land reforms of the countries
mentioned. There are three features of the Latin American land reforms
that are specific to that area: First, the reforms took place as a response to
the uprisings of landless peasants. Second, the reforms ended the system of
semiserfdom prevailing in the agrarian sector.2 Under this system the
peasants were divided into two groups: Those who had lifelong attachment
Ž .to the hacienda the estate of the big landowner and those who were
temporary workers. This system had evolved into a social norm: Some
peasants worked for the hacendados and others, at most, could do so as
Ž .temporary workers see Heath et al., 1969 . Third, the landed elite retained
sufficient political power so that they could influence the regime under
which the peasants received the land.3
I am going to use the Mexican case as the illustrative example, but the
other countries mentioned have had similar experiences. The former
owners were not compensated for the expropriation of their land. The
entity that received the land was the community of peasants. The members
of the community worked on the land, the ejido, and distributed the yield
equally among themselves. The land could not be transferred in any
manner and the peasants were forbidden to hire labor services. The right
to use the land passed from one generation to the next one. If a holder of
a plot of land did not cultivate it, the right to cultivate it was given to
someone else. The latter rule applied also to land held by private owners.4
2 By a system of semiserfdom I mean the production relations operating in the manorial
estate, known in the development literature as debt peonage or bonded labor services. See
Ž .Binswanger et al. 1995 .
3 This view about the political power of the landed elite underlies the studies on the
agrarian structure of the countries mentioned. For a clear and short discussion of it see Ray
Ž .1998 .
4 Peru had an experience similar to that of Mexico. The only difference in Bolivia is that
peasants received individual plots instead of communal lands. They were not forbidden to
hire workers but the size of the plots was so small that they were precluded from hiring labor
services de facto.
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Before the reform in Mexico, 5% of the population held 80% of the
farmland. In 1990, the ejidos controlled around 50% of the agricultural
5 Ž .land. Small private farms below 5 hectares constitute less than 10% of
Ž .the total farmland see Otsuka et al., 1992 . The evidence shows that the
Ž .ejidos’ performance is worse than that of the private sector. Yates 1981
Ž .uses data provided by Nguyen and Martinez Saldivar 1979 and estimates
that the yield per harvested hectare in the ejidos was between 50 and 80%
lower than that of comparable private farms. Moreover, Martinez Hernan-
Ž .dez 1992 reports that during the period 19761983 the average income of
an ejido member was only 47.6% of the minimum wage. In 1990 74.1% of
the ejidatarios received an income lower than minimum wage.
The question I address is why a society that has already chosen to
expropriate land owned by the landed elite, would give the land to the
peasants under an inefficient restricted ownership regime. In particular,
given the evidence just cited, it is not obvious why the peasants preferred
to receive land under such a regime instead of working in the privately
owned lands.6 This paper suggests that the landed elite, facing the expro-
priation of their land, preferred the peasants to receive the land without
full rights. The reason for this preference is that, when land is sufficiently
abundant, as in the Latin American countries mentioned, rents of the land
are maximized when not all the land is privately owned.
To illustrate this idea I develop a model economy populated by two
Ž .types of individuals: Aristocrats the hacendados and peasants. I take as
given that the system of semiserfdom has been eliminated. The social
unrest that led to the expropriation of the aristocrats’ land is modeled as if
the members of the society could vote on the amount of land to be
expropriated. In the equilibrium of the model, the aristocrats prefer not all
the land to be privately owned. By exploiting the prevailing social norm,
the aristocrats are able to divide the peasants into two groups: Those who
can work for the landed elite, and those whose only choice is to farm
expropriated land. These two groups have opposite preferences on the
amount of expropriated land: Those who can work for the aristocrats want
none; those who cannot want more land expropriated than the aristocrats
want. In this way, the aristocrats can build enough of a constituency so
their most preferred outcome is chosen by the society.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I describe the
environment. Section 3 studies the model economy after the ownership
5 In Bolivia, 30% of the farmland was distributed to 35% of the peasant families in the late
1950’s. In Peru, around 50% of the agricultural land was transferred to 10% of the peasant
Ž .families in 1973. See Wilkie 1974, 1993 .
6 Ž .Brannon and Baklanoff 1984 describe the process of land reform in Yucatan: ‘‘condi-´
 tions at the beginning of the reform became so chaotic that some groups of ejidatarios
mutinied and demanded a return to the old system.’’
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regime on land has been chosen. Section 4 analyzes under which condi-
tions the equilibrium of the model resembles a Latin America land reform.
In Section 5 I comment on some modeling assumptions. Section 6 studies
the relationship between population size and the ownership regime cho-
sen. Section 7 concludes.
2. THE ENVIRONMENT
The economy lasts one period and is populated by a measure N
individuals. They value the consumption of a composite commodity, y, and
do not value leisure. Each individual is endowed with one unit of time. The
consumption good is produced using land and the individuals’ endowments
of time. There is a group of individuals, called aristocratswho are to
resemble the group of the hacendadoswhose measure is A. The rest of
the individuals are called peasants. The total amount of farmland in the
economy is denoted as L. Each aristocrat has LA units of land at his
disposal. A land reform is modeled as an expropriation and a reallocation
of land. All the individuals vote on the amount of land to be kept by the
aristocrats. The rest of the land is expropriated. For simplicity, I have
assumed that all votes are equally weighted. Land cannot be left unculti-
vated. The land kept by the aristocrats is called private land. The expropri-
ated land is called communal land and is left to those peasants who want
to cultivate it under a common property regime. The group of the
aristocrats, before the voting takes place, collectively choose those peas-
ants who can work for them. They are called private workers and can
either offer their labor services to any aristocrat or cultivate communal
land. Those whose only choice is to farm communal land are called
communal workers. This division is sustained by the social norms prevail-
ing in the society, as mentioned in the Introduction. The model is orga-
nized in the following stages:
First Stage: The Diision of the Peasants. The aristocrats, collectively,
decide the number of private workers, P, who, for simplicity, are randomly
chosen across all peasants. The rest of the peasants, C, are communal
workers. The aristocrats commit to not hire any communal worker. This
commitment is sustained by the existing social norm: some peasants could
work for the aristocrats, and the rest could not.
Second Stage: The Expropriation of Land. All the individuals vote on the
amount of private land, L . Each aristocrat is expropriated, withoutp
Ž .compensation, L L A units of land.p
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Third Stage: The Competitie Equilibrium. The private workers decide
whether to work for an aristocrat or cultivate communal land, L L ,p
along with the communal workers. The aristocrats compete to hire private
workers. Individuals produce and consume.
Throughout the paper, the private sector is that in which land is
privately owned, comprising aristocrats and those private workers who
work for the aristocrats. The communal sector is the sector in which no
individual has individual rights to the land and is composed of those
peasants who cultivate communal land.
Each aristocrat has access to the production technology,
1 F l , n   l  1  n ,  0,Ž . Ž .Ž .p
where l is private land and n denotes labor time. The parameter  is less
than zero; thus, the elasticity of substitution between land and labor is less
than one. For simplicity, I assume that the return to managerial time is
zero. The private workers who work for an aristocrat receive a wage, y .p
The rest of the yield is the rent received by the aristocrat, y . The peasantsa
who farm communal land use the technology
1 F l , n    l  1  n ,  0,  0, 1 .Ž . Ž . Ž .Ž .c
Each peasant in the communal sector receives the average product as a
rent, denoted as y . I assume that the technology used in the communalc
sector is less productive than that used in the private sector. This lower
productivity is meant to capture the fact that communal organization of
the production process is less efficient than private organization. This is
modeled as the parameter  being less than one.
3. THE COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
In this section I analyze the competitive equilibrium of the model
economy for a given division of the peasants and a given amount of
expropriated land. Thus, P and L are given. At the beginning of thisp
stage, private workers decide whether to stay in the private sector or to
join the communal sector. Let us denote as N the number of privatep
workers who stay in the private sector. This number is a function of Lp
and P. Since private workers can move freely and the technology displays
constant returns to scale, their wage is determined by the aggregate
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variables,
F L , NŽ .p p p
y P , L  . 1Ž .Ž .p p Np
It is assumed that, although the aristocrats can commit to not hire
communal workers, they cannot enforce a collusive agreement to pay the
private workers less than their marginal product. The fact that labor is the
scarce factor makes aristocrats compete for workers and, therefore, they
end up paying the marginal product of labor. The discussion of the
reasonableness of these assumptions is postponed to Section 5.
Each aristocrat receives a fraction 1A of the amount of private land
and, hence, the same fraction of the aggregate rents of land. Their
consumption is
L F L , NŽ .p p p p
y P , L   . 2Ž .Ž .a p A Lp
The number of peasants in the communal sector is N  C PN .c p
Each one of them receives the average yield in the communal sector,
1
y P , L   F L L , N . 3Ž .Ž . ž /c p c p cNc
If all the private workers stay in the private sector, N  P, we have thatp
Ž . Ž .y P, L 	 y P, L . If N  P, the number N must be such thatp p c p p p
Ž . Ž .y P, L  y P, L . Thus, the number of private workers that stay in thep p c p
Ž .private sector is a function of the amount of private land, N   P, L .p p
Ž . Ž .There exists an amount of land 	 P such that if L 	 	 P all the privatep
workers remain working for the aristocrats, N  P; otherwise some ofp
them join the communal sector, N  P.7 This will be important top
determine the individuals’ preferences on the amount of private land.
Now we turn to analyzing the aristocrats’ rents. For any given number of
Ž .workers in the private sector, maximization of 2 implies that the
landlabor ratio must be equal to
1

 ; 4Ž .ž / 1 Ž .
7 These two functions,  and 	, are defined in Lemma 1 in the Appendix.
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that is,
 y n , 
nŽ .a  0.
 l
This will be important to understanding the aristocrats’ preferences on the
amount of privately owned land, which is analyzed in the next section.
4. A LATIN AMERICAN LAND REFORM
In this section I analyze the conditions under which the equilibrium of
the model captures the main features of a Latin American land reform.
The parameters are restricted to the subset defined by the following
assumptions:
Assumption 1. AN2.
Ž .1 Assumption 2. 
 1  .
1  1 Ž .Assumption 3. 	 2.
Assumption 4. N L
 A.
Assumption 1 rules out the equilibrium in which the aristocrats are the
majority of the population.8 Assumption 2 implies that cultivating land
communally is very inefficient. Assumptions 2 and 3 together impose a
lower bound  to the possible values of . This bound is less than 1.
These two assumptions will greatly simplify the analysis. Assumption 4 tells
us that land is the relatively abundant factor, as in the Latin American
countries we are focusing on.
4.1. The Expropriation of Land
In this section I analyze the individuals’ preferences on the amount of
privately owned land. Particularly, I shed light on why the aristocrats
prefer that not all the land be privately owned.
PROPOSITION 1. Under Assumptions 14, the priate workers’ rent is a
single-peaked function of the amount of priate land. The priate workers’
most preferred oting outcome is L, for any number of priate workers P.
8 I do not discuss this case because the aristocrats are to resemble the landed elite of a
typical Latin American country, who owned most of the farm land and usually composed a
very small fraction of the population. In the countries mentioned in the Introduction the
landed elite composed about 5% of the population.
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Proposition 1 states that the private workers, rather than expropriating
any land, prefer the aristocrats to cultivate all the land as a means to raise
their wage. The idea is the following: The wage only depends on the
landlabor ratio in the private sector, L N . For any amount of privatep p
Ž .land that satisfies L 	 	 P all the private workers stay in the privatep
sector, N  P, which implies that L N increases with L . For anyp p p p
Ž .amount of private land such that L  	 P some private workers join thep
communal sector, N  P. The landlabor ratio could decrease or in-p
crease with L . It is shown in the Appendix that it is increasing.p
PROPOSITION 2. Under Assumptions 14, the communal workers’ rent is
single-peaked. Their most preferred oting outcome is an amount of priate
Ž . Ž .land 	 P that satisfies 0 	 P  L, for any P.
Since the wage in the private sector strictly increases with the amount of
private land, it follows that for any amount or private land less than or
Ž . Ž .equal to 	 P the rent in the communal sector, y P, L , increases withc p
Ž .the amount of private land, too. For any L  	 P all the private workersp
stay in the private sector, N  P and y  y . Any increase in the amountp p c
of private land decreases the land-labor ratio in the communal sector and
Ž .reduces the average yield. Therefore, y has a maximum at 	 P . Thus,c
communal workers, who had no other choice but farming communal land,
prefer the aristocrats to keep some land, so that the private workers stay in
the private sector. Otherwise, the average product in the communal sector
would be too small.
PROPOSITION 3. Under Assumptions 14, the aristocrats’ rent is single-
peaked. The aristocrats’ most preferred outcome is an amount of priate land

P that satisfies 0 
P L for any P.
Assumption 2 implies that whenever the landlabor ratio in the private
sector is 
, the wage is greater than the average yield in the communal
Ž .sector. This is equivalent to stating that 
P 	 P , for any P. We know
Ž .that for any L 	 	 P , at the competitive equilibrium stage all the privatep
workers decide to stay in the formal sector, N  P. I showed in Section 3p
that 
 is the landlabor ratio for which the aristocrats’ rents are maxi-
Ž Ž ..mized see Eq. 4 . Thus, the aristocrats prefer 
P to any amount of land
Ž .greater than 	 P . It is shown in the Appendix that y is an increasinga
Ž Ž ..function of L in the interval 0, 	 P . Thus, the aristocrats most pre-p
Ž .ferred outcome is 
P which is lower than L, by Assumption 4 .
Proposition 3 states that the aristocrats prefer to have expropriated
some land rather than to cultivate it. Let us analyze the rationale for their
behavior. We have assumed that the elasticity of substitution between land
and labor is less than one and that land is the relatively abundant factor.
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Private workers are paid their marginal product. These three assumptions
imply that if too much land competes for workers, the rent paid to private
land decreases. To rise the land rent the wage must be depressed. To
prevent the wage from raising, the aristocrats would like to leave land
unused, but unused land is expropriated and given to the peasants. The
expropriated land is cultivated under a communal regime, where peasants
are forbidden to hire workers, so communal land does not compete for
workers. Furthermore, if the wage paid in the private sector is high enough
Žwhich is the case if the landlabor ratio in the private sector is equal to
.
 , no private worker wants to join the communal sector.
We have shown that the individuals’ rents are single-peaked functions of
the amount of private land; thus, we can apply the median voter theorem
Ž .see Mueller, 1989 . The next proposition describes the voting outcome for
a given number of private workers, P.
PROPOSITION 4. The amount of land expropriated is a function of the
NŽ . Ž . Ž .number of priate workers and satisfies L P  	 P if P  A, L Pp p2
N N NŽ . 
P if  A
 P
 , and L P  L if P .p2 2 2
Communal workers prefer to have a greater amount of land to be
expropriated than the aristocrats, and the private workers want none. The
Ž .three candidates to be the voting outcome satisfy 	 P  
P L. Since
preferences are single peaked, it follows that communal workers prefer 
P
Ž .to L and private workers prefer 
P to 	 P . If the communal workers are
Ž .the majority of the population, 	 P units of land become private and the
rest is expropriated. If private workers are the majority of the population,
the aristocrats keep all the land, but they have to cultivate it, as was
required by the land reform laws in Bolivia, Mexico, and Peru. If neither
group is the majority, the aristocrats keep 
P units of land, and the rest
becomes communal land.9
4.2. The Diision of the Peasants
This section analyzes the division of the peasants between private and
communal workers under which the equilibrium of the model resembles a
Latin American land reform. We have seen that the amount of expropri-
ated land depends on the number of private workers. To determine this
9 I have assumed that all votes are equally weighted. This amounts to assuming that
peasants and aristocrats have the same power in the society. To model different political
power I could have assumed that one peasant’s vote is equivalent to  aristocrats’ votes,
1 1   1  0, 1 . In that case, the aristocrats would be the median voter if N A
 P
 N2 2  2
1   A.2 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number the aristocrats solve the problem
max y P , L P .Ž .Ž .a p
 P 0, NA
If the aristocrats chose PN2 A, the communal workers would be
Ž .the majority of the population and only 	 P units of land would remain
private; as a consequence, all the private workers would stay in the private
sector. In that case, the operating landlabor ratio in the private sector,
Ž .	 P , would be lower than the ratio that maximized land rents, 
. There-P
fore, the aristocrats never choose a number of private workers lower than
N2 A. If P were chosen so that N2 A
 P
N2, the operating
landlabor ratio would be 
 and the aristocrat’s rent would be a strictly
increasing function of the number of private workers, since
P Ž .1 1 y P , 
P  1  1  .Ž . Ž . Ž .a A
It follows that P	N2; that is, private workers constitute at least half of
the population. Now let us assume that the aristocrats choose PN2. In
that case, all land becomes private and the aristocrats are forced to
cultivate it. The aristocrats’ rent will be
Ž .1  
P L L
y P , L     1  ,Ž . Ž .a ž / ž /ž /A P P
which is also increasing with the number of private workers. It follows that
 4P N2, N A . Notice that if PN A, given Assumption 4, the
Ž .landlabor ratio L N A is greater than 
. The increase in yield
brought by the use of larger amounts of both inputs may or may not
compensate for the decrease in land rents implied by a larger landlabor
ratio. If the amount of per capita land, LN, is sufficiently large the
aristocrats choose PN2, regardless of the size of the aristocracy. If
that is not the case, the choice depends on the size of the aristocracy
relative to the total population. The following propositions state this result.
PROPOSITION 5. There exists  1, such that if LN	 
 the number
of priate workers is PN2 and the amount of priate land is L  
N2.p
PROPOSITION 6. If LN 
 there exists a critical number of aristocrats,
Ž . Ž .N N , such that for any A	N N the number of priate workers isa a
Ž .PN2 and the amount of priate land is L  
N2. If AN N , thep a
number of priate workers is PN A and the amount of priate land is
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Ž . Ž .L  L. The number N N satisfies 0
N N N2 and monotonicallyp a a
increases with the size of the population.
I identify the Latin American countries studied as countries with the
following features: First, the population and technological assumptions are
as in Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. Second, land is very abundant, N
 L
 .
This upper bound is strictly less than L
 A, which was the upper
bound stated in Assumption 4. Third, the prevailing social norm sustains a
division of the peasants characterized by N2 A
 P
N2.
The rationale I propose for the Latin America land reforms is the
following: Before the reform, a semiserfdom system prevailed and the
living standard of the peasants was so low that social unrest ensued. The
peasants demanded freedom, higher wages, and the possibility to cultivate
land by themselves. The end of the semiserfdom system brought to an end
to the ability of the aristocrats to reduce to a minimum the rent paid to the
peasants. The possibility of leaving land unused as a means of reducing
labor rents was then more crucial for them. That was banned by the land
reform laws: Any unused land was expropriated and given to the peasants
who claimed it. Thus, the problem was not to preserve all the land, but
how much land to have expropriated. The aristocrats colluded to not hire
some peasants. This collusion was sustained by the prevailing social norm:
Some peasants could work for the aristocratsbecause their families had
done so for generations, etc.and others could not. This way, the peas-
ants were divided into two groups with opposite preferences on the
amount of land to be expropriated. Given this opposition, the aristocrats
could build enough political support so that their most preferred outcome
was chosen by the society.10
Under this light, how are we to interpret the equilibrium in which all the
peasants become private workers, PN A? There are two interpreta-
tions. First, the one I have used so far: The aristocrats are able to break up
the social norm and allow all the peasants to move freely across sectors.
They do so if the number of peasants is sufficiently large, LN 
 and
Ž .AN N , so that the decrease in land rents brought by the use of a largea
amount of land is more than compensated for by the increase due to a
larger amount of labor services. The second interpretation has to do with
the effectiveness of the social norm. If it has become very weak, aristocrats
are not able to commit to not hire communal workers. In that case, given
10 In the equilibrium studied the wage paid to the private workers is greater than the rent
Ž Ž .. Ž Ž ..obtained in the communal sector, y P, L P  y P, L P . Private workers are paid abovep c
their reservation wage. This gap depends on  . Notice that the greater is  , the higher is the
productivity in the communal sector for any amount of land. Thus, the greater is  , the
smaller is the gap and the larger must be the amount of privately owned land to prevent
private workers from joining the communal sector.
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any amount of private land, competition for workers implies that private
and communal workers are paid equally. Peasants can foresee this and
rationally vote for all the land to become private. Consequently, aristocrats
choose PN A.11
4.3. On the Number of Landowners
So far, I have assumed that only aristocrats can own land. I have
modeled private ownership as being able to hire workers. Now I am going
to analyze why peasants were not given individual ownership of the land
expropriated. Let us assume now that the peasants can become landown-
ers. I am going to model it as if the aristocrats can decide, before the
expropriation of land takes place, the number of peasants who are going to
receive land with total rights. I am going to call them small owners and
denote their number by S. All individuals vote on the amount of land to be
privately owned, L . Once it has been voted, each aristocrat is expropri-p
ated LA  L units of land. An aristocrat keeps  L units and eacha p a p
small owner is given  L units. We have that  A  S 1. Like thes p a s
aristocrats, the group of small owners commit, at the production stage, to
hire only private workers.
The timing is as follows: At the division stage, the aristocrats choose
which workers are to be private and which peasants are to be small
owners. The other two stages are identical to those of the previous version
of the model. At the voting stage and the production stage, small owners
and aristocrats behave identically in every respect. As opposed to private
workers, just for simplicity, small owners cannot join the communal sector.
Since aristocrats and small owners behave identically, the number of
private workers and the amount of private land chosen in an economy in
which there are A aristocrats and S small owners are equal to those
chosen in an economy in which the number of aristocrats is A S and the
peasants cannot own land. The aristocrats always choose S such that the
total number of owners is less than or equal to N2, since for S	N2 A
the landowners are always the median voters. To analyze the equilibrium
outcome in this model economy, I am going to assume, first, that the
number of small owners is fixed, and I will show that the aristocrats’ rent is
a decreasing function of the number of small owners and of the amount of
land given to them.
11 This result is implied by Proposition 1 that states that private workers prefer all the land
to be privately owned for any number of private workers. This proposition holds if Assump-
tion 4 is satisfied. We will see in Section 6 that if population is sufficiently large, peasants
prefer all the land to be expropriated.
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Ž . Ž .For any population size that satisfies either N
 L 
 or L 
 
Ž .N L
 A and A S	N N , the number of private workers isa
N2 and the amount of private land is 
N2. The aristocrats’ rent is
N 1 1   1  1  , i a, s,Ž . Ž .i 2
which is decreasing with the number of small owners and also with the
Ž .fraction of the private land given to the small owners. If L 
 N
Ž .L
 A and A SN N , the aristocrats’ rent isa
Ž .1    L L  1  N A S , i a, s,Ž . Ž .Ž .i
which is also decreasing with the number of small owners and the amount
of land given to them. Hence, the number of small owners is zero. Thus, if
the hacendados, the group that I have called aristocrats, have the power to
decide the nature of the land reform, they never allow the peasants to own
land. The hacendados would allow the peasants to become owners if they
needed enough constituency to become the median voter. Since land is
abundant and the productivity in the informal sector is very low, the
aristocrats obtain enough support from formal workers, who prefer 
P to
Ž .the outcome most preferred by the informal workers, 	 P . Thus, the
hacendados do not need the small owners and they are better off whenever
the group of landowners is a very small fraction of the population.
There is no formal evidence for this hypothesis in the Mexican case, but
there exists some anecdotal evidence from the beginning of the agrarian
Ž .reform in Peru in the early 1970’s narrated by De Soto 1989 . Right
before the reform was enacted, owners of land in the outskirts of Lima
engaged with settlers in organizing fictitious invasions of the land, receiv-
ing in exchange, ‘‘more money than expropriation would have brought but
  Ž .less than the normal sale price’’ p. 30 . If the owners were better off
having the land invaded instead of selling it, it must be because after the
sale the new owner has full rights on the land, whereas after the invasion
he or she does not.
This analysis also suggests that if the aristocrats had allowed some
peasants to become owners of land, they would have had all the incentives
to give the peasants a property as small as possible. In that case, the
peasants very well would have ended up being worse off than joining the
communal sector. The Mexican history gives us a hint of why the private
ownership of the land was never claimed by the beneficiaries of the
Ž .reform: Mendieta y Nunez 1937 reports that in the middle of the 19th˜
century the Mexican government, urged by the need to raise taxes, issued
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several acts. First, the Catholic Church, exempted from paying taxes, had
expropriated a large fraction of its land. The aim was to transfer it under
an individual property regime to the tenants, but such high taxes were
imposed that they mostly sold their property to the big landowners, who
could evade taxes easily. In many cases, the big landowners used violence
to force the tenants to sell them the land. Second, the community, the base
of the agrarian property among the peasants descended from the Indians,
was declared not a legal entity and, therefore, unable to own land. Under
Ž .the Act of Waste Land 1857 the Indian communal lands were appropri-
able by anyone who denounced the existence of wasteland to the authori-
ties. Later on, the government tried to correct this situation by ruling that
the peasants who traditionally used the Indian communal lands were to
receive the individual property of the land, on the same basis as the
tenants of the lands of the Church. The result was the same.
5. SOCIAL NORMS AND THE ARISTOCRATS’ POWER
We have seen that, in the subset of the parameter space considered, the
equilibrium of the model matches the nature of a Latin American land
reform. Two assumptions are key to obtain this result: The ability of the
aristocrats to commit to not hiring communal workers and the competition
Ž .for private workers at the competitive third stage. The first assumption is
based on social norms inherited from the prereform times. In this section I
present some historical evidence on the agrarian structure of a typical
Latin American country and argue that these two assumptions capture its
main features.
Ž .The work by Bazant 1977 is a case study of a Mexican hacienda, Bocas,
in San Luis Potosı, right before the revolution of 1915. There were two´
types of workers: peons and tenants. The former were permanent workers
on the hacienda and the latter were peasants who used some of the land
that the hacendado left uncultivated. The tenants paid a rent for the land
and occasionally did some work for the hacendado. The author’s account
of the wage paid to peons and the income of the tenants suggests that
peons’ income was at least 20% higher than that of the tenants. He also
reports the permanent struggle of the tenants to pay a lower rent to the
owner of Bocas. At the end of the study the author offers anecdotal
evidence of owners of other haciendas offering to the peons of Bocas
higher wages than those they were receiving. After that, peons of Bocas
had a raise in their wage.
This piece of evidence suggests that assuming aristocrats are not able to
pay private workers their reservation wage is not unreasonable. In the
model private workers are paid their marginal product. This assumption is
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not critical for the model. What is essential is that the wage is an
increasing function of the landlabor ratio in the private sector. Sadoulet
Ž .1992 shows that in model economies that share the main characteristics
of the Latin American countries mentioned, an efficient contract would
feature a wage increasing with the amount of land.
The historical account of Bazant also suggests that the equilibrium
division of the peasants in the model resembles reasonably well the
Ždivision prevailing before the reforms. Private workers are to be identified
.with peons and communal workers with tenants. I take the view that that
organization had already been internalized as a social norm at the time of
the land reform. This social norm is the key feature of the economy that
sustains a division of the peasants into two groups with opposite interests
on the amount of expropriated land. The model also shows that if aristo-
crats break up that social normallowing all the peasants to be private
workersor if the social norm is eroded so that they are unable to commit
to not hiring communal workers, all the land becomes privately owned.
I have ruled out the possibility of private and communal workers
colluding. If they could do so, they would vote for all the land to be
privately owned by the aristocrats. I take the view that the social norm
impedes private and communal workers colluding. Nevertheless, when the
size of the population is sufficiently high this social norm is no longer
effective. The next section illustrates this point.
6. THE ROLE OF POPULATION SIZE
In Section 4 we have seen that the aristocrats, exploiting the prevailing
social norm in the society, are able to divide the peasants into two groups
with opposite preferences on private land. Given this opposition, the
landowners arise as the median voter. This ‘‘divide and conquer’’ policy is
not always possible. If the size of the population is sufficiently large,
private and communal workers’ preferences are maximized when all land is
communal. Therefore, the social norm is no longer operative in the
society. In this section I am going to explore the equilibrium of economies
that satisfy N	 L
 A; that is, land is no longer the relatively abun-
dant factor. Assumptions 1 and 2 still hold in this section, but Assumption
3 will be changed to
Assumption 3. 1
  0
In the previous section Assumption 3 implied that  could take values in
 .  .the interval , 0 , where 1. Here I restrict the set to 1, 0 to
simplify the analysis. I am going to assume, as in the basic model, that no
peasant can become a landowner.
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It is easy to see that in economies in which the size of the population
satisfies L
 A
N 2 L
, the equilibrium outcome is identical to
the one discussed in the previous section. Hence, I focus my analysis on
economies in which N	 2 L
.
6.1. Priatizing All the Land
2 L 1   1 Ž .Let us assume that the population size satisfies L
N  A.
 
 
NThe first term of the inequality can be written as L
 
 . The second2
term of the inequality and Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 imply that the
individuals’ preferences for private land are those already described in
 4Section 4. Aristocrats choose P N2, N A . Choosing PN2 is no
longer optimal since the amount of privately owned land would be
Ž .L N2  L, and therefore, the aristocrats are better off choosing PNp
 A.
2 L L 1   1 Ž .PROPOSITION 7. For any N such that 
N  A, the
 
 
number of priate workers is PN A and the amount of priate land is
L  L.p
6.2. Facing the Threat of Total Expropriation
The scenario is very different for any economy in which N	
L 1   1 Ž .  A. In this case the private workers’ preferences for private
 
Ž .land are not single-peaked. They show a minimum at 	 P . Their most
preferred outcome is either 0 or L. The private workers prefer L if their
Ž .number is small enough so they can be ensured a sufficiently high wage .
Ž .Let  N, A be the critical number of private workers such that if
Ž .P
  N, A the private workers’ most preferred outcome is L and their
most preferred outcome is 0 otherwise. It is shown in the Appendix that
Ž . N, A increases with the size of the population and that, under Assump-
 Ž . N , Ation 3 , decreases with N. Therefore, for the aristocrats to keep theN
Ž .land, they have to choose P
  N, A and it needs to be satisfied that
Ž .P A	N2. If N is sufficiently high, we have that  N, A  AN2
and the aristocrats are expropriated all the land. Thus, the aristocrats’
ability to ‘‘divide and conquer’’ depends on the population density. If the
population is too large, the aristocrats cannot offer high enough wages for
the peasants to prefer the wage instead the average yield in the communal
sector. In this case, although it goes beyond the scope of this paper, it
would benefit the aristocrats to give some peasants the right to own land
privately to build enough constituency so that they could keep the land.
The following propositions summarize these results.
L 1   1 Ž .PROPOSITION 8. If N	  A and Assumptions 1, 2, and 3
 
hold, gien any number P of priate workers, the priate workers’ preferences
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Ž . Ž .hae a minimum at 	 P . There exists a number  N, A such that if
Ž .P
  N, A the priate workers prefer all the land to be priately held. If
Ž .P  N, A they prefer all the land to be communal. For any N	
L 1   1 Ž .  A the informal worker ’s preferences are monotonically de-
 
creasing with the amount of priate land.
L 1   1 ˆ Ž .PROPOSITION 9. There exists a size of the population, N 
 
Nˆ Ž . A, such that for any NN we hae that  N, A   A. For any2
ˆNN, all the land becomes communal.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper provides a rationale for the land reform processes that many
Latin American countries have experienced during this century. It focuses
on the conflicts of interests that arise within a society as a basis for
understanding why a communal ownership regime on expropriated land
would be chosen instead of an efficient private ownership system. Two
assumptions are key for such conflicts to arise: Land and labor are
assumed to be complementary factors and land is the relatively abundant
Ž .factor. The first assumption is not unreasonable. Cornia 1985 estimates
output elasticity of land for a cross section of countries and finds it to be
decreasing with the landlabor ratio. An output elasticity decreasing in
this ratio is satisfied by a CES production function only if the elasticity
substitution parameter  is negative. The relative abundance of land is
widely acknowledged in the development literature as a key factor to
understand the evolution of the agrarian structure in Latin America.
In 1992, the Mexican government changed the Constitution so that the
ejido members were allowed to divide the ejidal land and become private
owners. In the terms of this model, they were made small owners. To
model this evolution of the reform, we should take in account the exis-
tence of an urban sector that wants to have inexpensive agricultural goods;
thus, they favor giving the peasants the ownership of the land, since it
increases the aggregate level of productivity in the agricultural sector. This
is a topic for further research.
APPENDIX
Ž . Ž . Ž .LEMMA 1. The function 	 . : 0, N A  0, L is strictly increasingm
Ž Ž .. Ž Ž ..with P and satisfies y P, 	 P  y P, 	 P . The inerse of this function isp c
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Ž .denoted as  . . The amount of priate land L is defined asm
1
min 
 N A , L .Ž .ž /½ 5 1   1Ž .
Ž . Ž .Proof. The existence of the function 	 . in the interval 0, L ism
ensured by the implicit function theorem. L is the amount of land whichm
Ž . Ž .satisfies lim y P, L  lim y P, L .P NA p m P NA c m
Ž . Ž .	 P L  	 PŽ . Ž .LEMMA 2. Let x P , x P , respectiely, be equal to , .p c P N A  P
  1 Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Both ratios satisfy x P 
 	 P 
 x P if L	 N A 
 andp c 1 
Ž . Ž . Ž .x P  	 P  x P otherwise.p c
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Proof. It is easy to check that x P 
 	 P 
 x P  x P 
 x P .p c p c
Ž .  Ž Ž ..   Ž Ž .. Notice that x P   y P, 	 P P   y P, 	 P L , i p, c.i i i p
Ž . ŽLet us denote x  L N  A . Let us assume that L 	 N 
. Ž Ž . . 1   Ž . Ž .A 
   1   a n d x P  x P . T h e n ,p c
Ž Ž .. Ž Ž .. Ž Ž .. Ž Ž .. Ž . Ž .y P, 	 P y P, 	 P  y 1, x P y 1, x P 	 y 1, x y 1, x  1,p c p p c c p c
Ž Ž .. Ž Ž .. Ž . Ž .which contradicts that y P, 	 P y P, 	 P  1. Hence, x P 
 x P .p c c c
The other case is proved in a similar fashion.
Ž . Ž . Ž .  Ž .LEMMA 3. For any gien P 0, N A , x P and x P satisfy x Pp c p
 Ž .  Ž .  Ž .  Ž .  Ž . x P 	 0. If x P  x P  0 then x P  x P  0.c p c p c
Ž Ž .. Ž Ž ..Proof. Visual inspection of the equality y 1, x P  y 1, x Pp p c c
Ž . Ž .yields that x P and x P move in the same direction.p c
1  1 Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .LEMMA 4. If L	 N A 
 the ratios x P and x P arep c
strictly increasing functions of P and are decreasing otherwise.
Ž  Ž .. Ž Ž . Ž ..Proof. It is easy to check that sign x P  sign 	 P  P 	 P p
 1  1 Ž Ž . Ž .. Ž . Ž .sign 	 P  x P . Thus, if L N A 
 Lemma 2 ensuresp 
Ž . Ž . Ž  Ž ..that 	 P  x P  0, which implies that sign x P  0 for all P.p p
Ž  Ž ..Lemma 3 implies that sign x P  0. The rest of the cases are proved inc
a similar way.
Ž . Ž .Proof of Proposition 1. For any L 	 	 P , y P, . strictly increasesp p
Ž .with L since N  P. For any L  	 P the number of private workersp p p
Ž . Ž .that stay in the private sector is N   L , which satisfies 	 N  L .p p p p
Ž .The wage only depends on the land-labor ratio L  L . Assumptions 1p p
and 2 imply that N 2 L
. This inequality and Assumption 4 imply that
1  1 Ž . Ž . Ž .L N A 
 . Lemma 4 implies that L  L increases withp p
Ž .L ; therefore y P, L strictly increases with L .p p p p
Ž . Ž .Proof of Proposition 2. For any L 	 	 P , y P, . strictly decreasesp c
Ž .with L . For any L  	 P Lemmas 3 and 4 and Proposition 1 yield thatp p
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Ž . Ž .y strictly increases with L . Thus, y P, . has a maximum at L  	 P .c p c p
Ž .Proof of Proposition 3. Assumption 2 implies that y P, 
P p
Ž . Ž . Ž .y P, 
P for any P 0, N A . This implies that 
P 	 P for anyc
Ž . Ž .P 0, N A . Recall that 
P satisfies  y P, 
P L  0, for anya p
Ž .P 0, N A . Assumption 4 implies that 
P L. Thus, for any L 	p
Ž . Ž . Ž .	 P , y P, L has a maximum at 
P. For any L  	 P concavity of ya p p a
Ž . Ž .with respect to L ensures that dy P, L dL   y P, L L p a p p a p p
Ž . Ž Ž .. Ž . Ž . Ž . y P, L   L   P   y P, L L   y P, 
P L  0.a p p a p p a p
Ž . Ž .Thus, y P, . is strictly increasing for any L  	 P and it has a maxi-a p
mum at 
P.
Proof of Proposition 4. Apply the median voter theorem.
Ž . Ž . Ž .Proof of Proposition 5. y N2, 
N2 	 y N A, L if A	N Na a a
Ž .where N N is equal toa
12 Ž .  11N L L
N 1    .Ž . ž / ž / ž /2 
 
ž /
1Ž . Ž .N N is bounded above by N and increases with N. N N 
 0 ifa a22 L Ž1 .  Ž1 . Ž . Ž1  2  
 1  , where  . For  1, 1
N
.  Ž1 .  2 Ž1 .  2   1  . Thus, there exists  1, such that
for any 	  , the inequality is satisfied. Thus, for any 

 LN,
Ž . Ž .y N2, 
N2 	 y N A, L for any A.a a
Proof of Proposition 6. It follows from the proof of Proposition 4.
L 1   1 Ž .Proof of Proposition 7. Since N  A, Lemmas 2, 3, and
 
4 imply that the private and communal workers’ preferences for private
land are those described in Propositions 1 and 2. Assumption 2 implies
that aristocrats’ preferences are those described in Proposition 3. From
Proposition 6 it follows that the number of private workers is either N2
2 Lor N A. Since N	 it follows that L
 
N2. Since y is strictlya

increasing with the number of private workers, it follows that PN A
and L  L.p
Proof of Proposition 8. First, I prove the result concerning the private
workers preferences on private land. Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 imply that if N
L 1   1 Ž . Ž . Ž .  A, for any L 
 	 P , y P, L decreases with L .p p p p
 
Ž .Therefore y has a minimum at L  	 P . The private workers’ mostp p
Ž .preferred outcome is either 0 or L. Direct comparison of y P, 0 andp
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Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .y P, L shows that y P, L 	 y P, 0 if P
  N, A and y P, L p p p p
Ž . Ž .y P, 0 otherwise. The expression of  N, A isp
 N , AŽ .
1Ž .1 1Ž . 1 L   1   1 Ž . Ž .Ž .Ž . ž /1  N  A L .
ž /
The result for the communal workers’ preferences follows from Lemmas 2,
3, and 4, and Propositions 2 and 8.
ˆProof of Proposition 9. First, I prove the existence of N. The derivative
Ž . N , Aof can be expressed asN
Ž .1 11 L  x  1 Ž .
Ž1 .    1 .H ,2ž / ž /1  1 N
Ž .where x L N A , H is
Ž .1 1  x  1   x  1 Ž . Ž .
Ž1 .1    ,
ž / ž /1   x  1 Ž .
 1   N  AŽ .Ž .and  . The three first terms of the derivative are alwaysN A
 1 Ž .positive and H is negative at x 
 . H increases monotonically1 
Ž1 .with N and for N sufficiently high, H 1  . , which is less1 
than zero under Assumptions 2 and 3. Thus, H is always negative. It
Ž . Ž . N , A  N , Aimplies that the derivative of is always negative. The limit ofN N
ˆ ˆ Ž .is 0. Therefore, there exists N such that for any NN  N, A N2.
ˆA is satisfied. Hence, for any N	N and regardless of aristocrats’ prefer-
ences all the land becomes communal.
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